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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the role of the EU institutions in guiding the EMU reform
process. Many have argued that the institutions have had to adapt to a
‘constraining’ environment in which EU negotiations are highly salient and
touch upon ‘core state powers’. To explain how they have been adapting, we
provide a detailed process tracing analysis of their role in setting up the
banking union. We use insights from principal-agent (PA) theorizing, but
extend this framework to account for situations in which there are multiple
agents. The analysis shows that in spite of overlapping interests, functional
imperatives and a crisis atmosphere, there was nothing inevitable about the
banking union. It came about through new patterns of institutional
collaboration at different stages and between different levels of decision
making. We explore the implications of this type of collaborative leadership at
the level of agents, arenas, process and substance.
KEYWORDS Banking union; economic and monetary union; EU institutions; European integration;
leadership; principal-agent theory
Introduction
There has been much debate about the role of the EU institutions in mana-
ging the euro crisis and EMU reform process. Many have pointed out that
the institutions struggled in the early years of the crisis (Bastasin [2012];
Pisani-Ferry [2014]; Wallace [2015]). Scholars generally agree that they had
to adapt to a difficult (‘constraining’) environment in which EU negotiations
were highly salient in many member states and touched upon ‘core state
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powers’ (Bickerton et al. [2015]; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs [2014]; Hooghe
and Marks [2009]; Schimmelfennig [2014]).
This article intends to shed light on how the institutions have been adapt-
ing. We provide a process tracing analysis of the establishment of the banking
union (Beach and Pedersen [2013]: 63–67) and use it to flesh out the insti-
tutions’ individual roles and their joint ability to provide leadership. The litera-
ture on EMU reform has placed great emphasis on competition between
institutions, and on the rivalry between the European Council presidency
and Commission in particular (Bauer and Becker [2014]; Chang [2013]; Fabbrini
[2013]). Instead, we argue that the banking union revealed the heightened
interdependence between the intergovernmental and supranational insti-
tutions, which had far-reaching implications for how the process was set up
and managed. We contend that new institutional leadership is less about
being ‘the engine’ and more about ‘laying out tracks’ (cf. Hodson [2013]).
Some of these implications have already been hinted at in the literature on
the banking union. De Rynck (2016) highlights the guiding role of the ECB in
getting the project on the agenda. Epstein and Rhodes (2014, 2016) point to
the opportunities to engage in ‘venue-shopping’: strategically switching
between different levels of decision-making. The analyses of Howarth and
Quaglia (2013, 2014) reveal the mix of intergovernmental and supranational
elements in the decision-making processes regarding the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The literature,
however, comes to different conclusions about the ability of the institutions to
provide leadership in these negotiations. Epstein and Rhodes argue ‘that
Europe’s supranational institutions have taken advantage of the crisis to
push through reforms that fundamentally contradict the perceived interests
of many member states’ (Epstein and Rhodes [2014]: 6). Hennessy, on the
other hand, maintains that the EU institutions acted mostly as ‘facilitators’
and that member states determined the design of financial supervision (Hen-
nessy [2014]: 154–155). Donnelly (2014, 2016) even draws a link between the
EU’s prevailing intergovernmentalism and the generally disappointing results
in terms of providing financial stability.
This article does not discuss all the institutional actions that contributed to
the launch of the banking union. Instead, we focus on the key moments at
which the negotiations could have stalled or even collapsed. We explain how
the institutions were jointly able to keep the process going. In the next
section, we present and explain the concept of collaborative leadership,
using insights from principal-agent (PA) theory. We explore the implications
of collaborative leadership on four dimensions of the decision-making
process: agents, arenas, process and substance. The subsequent process
tracing analysis fleshes out the interplay and division of labour between the
different institutions in detail. In the conclusion, we discuss some of the limits
of collaborative leadership, in terms of overall autonomy and individual control.
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Analytical framework: Multiple agents in a constraining
environment
In classic EU integration theory, institutional leadership is generally equated
with supranational entrepreneurship (Haas [1958]; Moravcsik [1999]). The
Commission, together with the European Parliament (EP) and European
Court of Justice (ECJ), are conceptualized as the ‘engines’ of further EU inte-
gration (Pollack [2003]). Leadership thus refers to the ability to drive the
machinery forward, with a sense of purpose and towards a relatively clearly
defined goal, of the type provided by the (first and second) Delors Commis-
sion in the run-up to the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht
(Beach [2005]). Over the years, the ‘Delors type of leadership’ might have
become a somewhat unfortunate model of a power-hungry Commission
‘hard wired to pursue ever closer union’ (Peterson [2015]: 187–188). In the
post-Maastricht era, the possibilities for such entrepreneurship are more
limited. As the EU has moved into more sensitive and salient issue-areas,
such as fiscal policy or economic governance, its member states have
become more wary of transferring competences and the Commission has
been less able to fulfil its traditional role.
New intergovernmentalism (NI) highlights some of the post-Maastricht
developments, in particular the different patterns of delegation from the
member states (principals) to the institutions (agents). NI takes as its point
of departure the claim of ‘integration without supranationalization’ (Bickerton
et al. [2015]: 706). It argues that the significant extension of the EU’s policy
agenda has not been accompanied by a similar transfer of decision-making
powers to the central level. Instead, the Community method had to give
way to governance by means of intergovernmental coordination, pivoting
around the European Council and the Council of Ministers (Fabbrini [2013]:
1005; Mény [2014]: 1340). The increased involvement of the intergovernmen-
tal levels is often seen as a challenge to the supranational institutions in par-
ticular, and to the functioning of the EU in general (Bauer and Becker [2014];
Chang [2013]; Puetter [2014]). Somewhat overlooked is the potential for inter-
institutional collaboration across the divide. In the EMU reform process, this
took the shape of high-level political cooperation between the Presidents
of the involved institutions – but there was also active cooperation, for
instance in the drafting of specific reform measures, at cabinet and services
levels.1
To explore the implications of having multiple agents operating in a con-
straining environment, we use insights from principal-agent (PA) theory.
While PA theorizing focuses on the interplay between principals and their
agents, the emphasis is generally on the acts of delegation by, and the
control mechanism of, the principals (Hawkins et al. [2006]). Agent autonomy
or discretion is seen as deliberately granted and conditional (Pollack [2006]:
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167). Agents will attempt to circumvent principal’s controls, but such attempts
come down to hiding their actions or withholding information – strategies
which presume a certain level of negligence from the side of the principals.
We would not expect to find this kind of negligence in the highly salient
and politically contested EMU reform process.
PA provides us with relevant conjectures on how agents deal with, or rather
make use of, multiple principals. However, it has little to say about the oppo-
site scenario, in which there are multiple agents. Like NI, PA sees principals
selecting from a pool of existing agents, or creating new ones, under the
assumption that these agents will act as rivals (Hawkins and Jacoby [2006]:
203). Hawkins and Jacoby (2006: 205–212) briefly mention how agents can
shape their own mandate by incorporating others (third parties), but they
do not explore the implications of such a two-step delegation process. The
concept of collaborative leadership serves to flesh out these implications
more systematically. We define collaboration as the interplay and/or division
of labour between different agents. It can thus refer to two things: either insti-
tutions actively working together (interplay), or institutions coordinating their
individual actions (division of labour). Such coordination can be informal and
might sometimes even be implicit.
We see collaborative leadership as a mechanism that consists of four
elements, which refer to four levels of the decision-making process: the
main agent(s) involved, the negotiating arena(s), the set-up and organization
of the process, and the substance of what is currently being negotiated (see
Table 1). This mechanism merely seeks to account for the role of the insti-
tutions, not the outcomes of the EMU reform and/or banking union nego-
tiations in full. It thus constitutes a necessary, rather than sufficient, part of
any explanation of the establishment of the banking union. Below, we
discuss the implications in terms of agent strategies. In the Conclusion, we
will discuss the trade-offs, meaning the limitations to this particular type of
institutional leadership.
First, in a situation of multiple agents, rather than waiting for and working
from formal mandates from their principals, these agents can informally
assign themselves and each other to specific, and sometimes unusual, tasks.
Because this delegation is informal or even implicit, it does not require ex
ante commitment from the principals. On the other hand, it is also more diffi-
cult to monitor ex post. There is also one important caveat: principals not only
define the scope of agents’ activity ex ante, they can also revoke or amend
mandates ex post, or else prevent the exercise of an existing mandate
(Pollack [2006]: 179). Agents will not stray too far from current principal pre-
ferences to ensure that they will be re-mandated.
Second, in a constraining environment, agents need to prove themselves
willing to yield the stage at the moment when progress is no longer possible
at their level. Agents will opt for a plethora of different forums and working
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formats to ensure the continuation of the process. In negotiation theory this
practice is sometimes referred to as ‘venue-shopping’. On a more general
level, it points to a form of ‘joint stewardship’. As our analysis will show, the
banking union did not have ‘founding fathers’ but rather a series of temporary
caretakers, none of which had the ability to control, let alone steer, all relevant
developments. Previous PA analyses have shown that having multiple princi-
pals does not necessarily empower agents, as it is often difficult to make use
of the divisions between them (Hawkins and Jacoby [2006]: 226). We suggest
that having multiple agents might be a more promising way to increase their
overall autonomy.
Third, in a situation in which large-scale and explicit Treaty reform is clearly
not an option, reforms need to be dealt with in an incremental fashion by
means of an open-ended process. There was no Convention-like format for
discussing the entire reform package. Nor was there an end-date or final
goal in terms of a closing intergovernmental conference (IGC) at which all
remaining issues would be dealt with simultaneously (cf. Beach [2005]).
Table 1. The mechanism of collaborative leadership.
Element: Informal delegation Joint stewardship
Moving the goal
posts
Varying levels of
specificity
Level: The agent The arena The process The substance
Implications:
(in terms of
agent
strategies)
Rather than waiting
for clear
instructions or a
formal mandate,
institutions were
informally
assigning
themselves and
each other to
specific,
sometimes
unusual, tasks
Institutions opted for
different venues
and working
formats to ensure
that the process
kept moving. They
proved willing to
yield the stage
when progress was
no longer possible
at their level.
Institutions were
aware, and made
use, of the open-
ended character
of the process, in
which steps,
sequences and
deadlines could
sometimes be
firm, but at other
times were
remarkably
flexible.
Institutions were
aware, and
made use, of
the rather open
mandate, which
meant that
sometimes a
balance was
found by going
into great
detail,
sometimes by
leaving key
questions wide
open.
Trade-offs:
(with regard
to the ability
to provide
leadership)
Informal delegation
does not require
ex ante
mandating by the
principals, but it
does require their
continued
commitment
throughout the
process. The
institutions need
to make sure they
are re-mandated.
Joint stewardship
might result in an
overall gain in
agents’ autonomy,
but this comes at
the expense of
individual agents’
ability to control
developments.
Flexible steps,
sequences and
deadlines make
it easier for the
agents to keep
the train moving.
On the other
hand, it provides
principals with
the opportunity
to let the process
run out of steam.
An open mandate
provides agents
with the
opportunity to
leave difficult
points for later.
On the other
hand, picking
the ‘low-
hanging fruit’
first also makes
it less likely that
these difficult
points will
eventually be
dealt with.
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In the EMU reform and the banking union negotiations, steps, sequences and
deadlines were sometimes very firm, but at other times remarkably flexible.
Agents can make use of this fact by suggesting movement of the goal
posts forward and backward on specific issues at specific points in the nego-
tiations. There are several examples of this in our analysis of the banking
union.
Fourth, the open-ended character of the process also has implications for
the substance of what was being negotiated at a specific point in time. There
may have been the image of a complete EMU or full-fledged banking union
somewhere on the horizon, but that did not mean that all these substantive
elements had to be dealt with to the same level of specificity. There was the
opportunity to ‘pick and choose’ which issues to deal with now, and which
issues to agree to in principle while leaving the details for later. Again,
agents can make use of this fact when formulating agendas and proposals
for discussion at a specific meeting. As will become clear from our analysis,
in agreeing on the substantive elements of the banking union, sometimes a
balance was found by going into very great detail, at other times by leaving
key questions wide open.
Empirical analysis: A triple jump in reverse
The banking union is generally considered to be one of the most significant
developments in European integration since the Maastricht Treaty. Table 2
provides an overview of its main elements. The single supervisory mechanism
(SSM),2 the single resolution mechanism (SRM), the single resolution fund
(SRF)3 and a significant part of the single rulebook were all negotiated
between June 2012 and April 2014.
We identify three phases: June to December 2012, January to June 2013,
and July 2013 to April 2014. Setting up the banking union was like doing a
triple jump in reverse. After the jump of the SSM, there followed a more
classic but no less important legislative step, with the completion of the
single rulebook, which included the Capital Requirements Directive (the
CRD 4),4 the Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (the BRRD)5 and
the Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, the (DGS),6 accompanied by
an initial agreement on ESM-related elements. This then enabled the final
hop of the SRM, with an initially tiny SRF, limited bridge financing and no
real backstop.
The three ‘moves’ required different patterns of institutional collaboration.
For the jump, the interplay between the European Council presidency and the
ECB was crucial for getting (and keeping) a banking union on the agenda, and
the interplay between the Commission and the Council was crucial for procur-
ing the SSM. For the step, the division of labour between the legislators (the
Ecofin Council and the EP) and the Eurogroup was crucial. This is because the
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Table 2. Overview of (decision making on) the main elements of the banking union.
Proposed Council negotiations
Council
agreement Trilogue/other negotiations Final agreement
Single rule book DGS 12 July 2010 September 2010 to
May 2011
16 June 2011 July to December 2013 December 2013
CRD4/
CRR
20 July 2011 January to May 2012
(largely)
15 May 2012 June 2012 to March 2013 March 2013
BRRD 6 June 2012 January to June 2013
(largely)
27 June 2013 September to December 2013 December 2013
Single Supervisory
Mechanism
SSM 12 September 2012 September to
December 2012
12 December
2012
January to April 2013 September 2013
Single Resolution
Mechanism
SRM 10 July 2013 September to
December 2013
18 December
2013
February to March 2014 March 2014
Single Resolution Fund SRF 18 December 2013 January to March
2014
21 May 2014
signature
Ratification by participating Member
States
November 2015
Direct Recapitalisation ESM 29 June 2012
European Council
to ESM
20 June 2013
Main
features
Approval by Member States
according to national procedures
June 2014
Political under-standing;
December 2015 by ESM Board
JO
U
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A
L
O
F
EU
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N
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BRRD pivoted around the bail-in principle, meant to shift the burden for
saving banks from taxpayers to share- and bondholders. While the Ecofin
was negotiating bail-in, the Eurogroup hammered out the rules for direct reca-
pitalization of banks by the ESM. On both elements, a provisional agreement
was reached in June 2013. These two agreements paved the way for the hop,
in which again other actors took centre stage. The European Council President
and the ECB played a minor role on the SRM, and the role of the Commission
was also more limited. Instead, the interplay between the rotating Council
presidency, the Council Secretariat and the Eurogroup was crucial in procuring
a deal, first in the Council and then with the EP.
The jump (launching the SSM and banking union)
Informal delegation was crucial from the very beginning of the process. Many
have pointed to the importance of the European Council and Euro Area
Summit of June 2012 (De Rynck [2016]; Glöckler et al. [2016]; Howarth and
Quaglia [2013]; Schäfer [2016]). Yet it would be difficult to argue that this is
where a banking union as such was put on the agenda.
The meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the Euro Area had
primarily dealt with the Spanish banking crisis. For many member states, reca-
pitalization of the distressed Spanish banking sector by the ESM had been the
main issue on the agenda. Initially there was talk of a limited, temporary
mechanism, but Chancellor Merkel seemed to favour a permanent structure
before the ESM could be brought into play. The meeting therefore invited
the Commission to present proposals for a single supervisory mechanism
and the Council to consider these proposals by the end of 2012.7 It is doubtful
whether the participants were aware that they were launching a ‘banking
union’ with this action. In these early stages, the concept was still unclear.
The more reluctant member states, for instance the Netherlands, equated it
with common supervision.8
At the European Council the following day, President van Rompuy pre-
sented a first draft of the four presidents’ ideas for deepening the economic
and monetary union (EMU).9 Furthermore, ECB president Draghi used his
speech to convince the Heads of State and Government of the dire need to
break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. While ‘various
opinions were expressed’ about the draft report, the conclusions mentioned
remarkably little about the first building block: an integrated financial frame-
work or ‘banking union’. Nevertheless, the European Council invited its Presi-
dent to develop a specific and time-bound road map for the initiatives in the
report, including
concrete proposals on preserving the unity and integrity of the Single Market in
financial services and which will take account of the Euro Area statement and,
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inter alia, of the intention of the Commission to bring forward proposals under
Article 127.10
Such internal deadlines are typically flexible, and in this particular case it was
unclear what stage of the decision making process needed to be reached by
December.11 More significant was the external deadline provided by the EP
elections of May 2014 and the corresponding change of the Commission
later that year. This combination of deadlines ruled out certain options,
notably Treaty change. For the SSM in particular, the use of Article 127
entailed that supervision would be given to the ECB. There was no legal
basis to do otherwise. This helped to speed up the process. Within the ECB,
a workgroup on supervision had been set up and intensive cooperation
with the Commission was established at all levels.12 Rather than providing
its opinion on the Commission proposals, the institutions were jointly drafting
the texts. As people directly involved note:
The ECB already had a clear view on what a banking union would look like. It had
developed the concept in house. They could thus provide the outline and the
main elements: supervision and resolution.13
This collaboration ensured that the two SSM proposals could be presented a
few months after the June European Council. The proposals were
accompanied by ‘a roadmap towards a banking union’ which merely recon-
ﬁrmed the elements mentioned in the Four Presidents’ Report.14 The
roadmap was never part of the Council discussions. Instead of clinging to
the vision of a complete banking union, the institutions decided to move
the goal posts closer. This they did by dropping the common deposit guaran-
tee scheme. In their interim report of October 2012 the four presidents
admitted that ‘sharing banking sector risks without more effective ﬁscal disci-
pline could otherwise lead to adverse incentives for sovereigns’.15 It was partly
due to the difﬁcult trilogues on the deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) directive,
where even an update of an existing directive, based on national schemes but
with more ambitious funding limits, had proven difﬁcult to agree upon.
At this point everything thus depended on securing the first step: meeting
the deadline on the SSM. As the institutions moved from agenda manage-
ment to process management, the European Council and ECB stepped back
while the rotating presidency and Council Secretariat started looking for a
feasible working format. The first thing to be decided was how the two Com-
mission proposals would be handled. Different decision-making rules applied.
On the (main) SSM regulation, which would concern the Euro Area Member
States, the EP only needed to be consulted. The accompanying regulation
on amending the EBA, however, fell under ordinary legislative procedure,
and was an issue for the EU as a whole. However, on substance the two pro-
posals were inextricably linked. For the Non-Euro Member States, especially
the UK, it was essential that the EBA rules be adapted to ensure that the
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new supervisory behemoth would not unilaterally control decision making in
the EBA. They wanted to use the unanimity requirement for the SSM Regu-
lation to ensure that de facto unanimity would also be required for the EBA
Regulation. For this reason, and in order to get the EP to adopt a constructive
attitude, the decision was taken to treat the two proposals as a package, while
never agreeing to any legal link.
The SSM was discussed for the first time at the informal Ecofin in Nicosia on
15 September. At first, the Cypriot presidency was not particularly eager to
take on such an enormous, not to mention politically sensitive, dossier.
However, a great deal of pressure from the Commission resulted in the Presi-
dency announcing that it would push for a deal before Christmas. The next
question was which working configuration would handle the proposals.
One obvious candidate was the financial services working group. But this
group fell under the full interpretation regime, which made the meetings
rather long and inefficient. It also meant that these meetings needed to be
planned many weeks in advance. Another candidate would have been the
financial service attaches, who were also dealing with the CRD4/CRR and
BRRD, but this working party was already overburdened with the single rule-
book legislation. Thus, in order to facilitate the work the Coreper decided to
set up an ad hoc working party, consisting of (high-level) representatives,
primary financial directors from the capitals. For the institutions this was
also an attempt to change the dynamics, under the belief that financial direc-
tors would be less inclined to engage in detailed discussions of the technical-
ities, but rather focus on the key political issues:
For attaches, it is easier to maintain that they do not have a mandate and there-
fore cannot proceed any further or make concessions. This will generally be
accepted. Whereas with financial directors, the idea is: you are here to take
decisions. This can be used to put pressure on member states.16
Such venue-shopping contributes to, but is seldom sufﬁcient for, reaching an
agreement. With a ﬂexible working format and knowing the ﬁnal deadline, the
Presidency and the Council Secretariat could start planning backwards. There
would be seven working party meetings in a period of two months. Neverthe-
less, there were a number of open issues in December, and an extra Ecoﬁn
meeting turned out to be necessary. In spite of institutional efforts to
explain otherwise, quite a few member states were still not convinced that
the ECB could or should take over supervision of all banks. A compromise
was reached with a system of combined direct and indirect supervision.
The hesitant member states could maintain that they would remain in
control over their smaller banks, while the more ambitious member states
could point out that the ECB would in principle be able to oversee any
bank in the Eurozone. After providing the necessary side payment to the
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UK in the form of double majority voting in the EBA, a deal was reached in the
early hours of 13 December 2012.
On 14 December, the European Council dared to look ahead to the entire
banking union package. While welcoming the agreement on the SSM, the
Heads of State and Government immediately urged for work to continue
on the other elements of the banking union. We contend that it was only
at this point that the banking union was formally put on the agenda. Para-
graph 11 marked out the trajectory:
The Commission will submit in the course of 2013 a proposal for a single resol-
ution mechanism for Member States participating in the SSM, to be examined by
the co-legislators as a matter of priority with the intention of adopting it during
the current parliamentary cycle.17
The steps as such were of course not new, but the endorsement was never-
theless important. This was because up until this point, progress beyond
single supervision was not guaranteed. There might have been sound aca-
demic arguments for why a system of European-level supervision and
national-level resolution would never work. But similar arguments had not
been sufﬁcient for keeping the common DGS on the agenda. From an insti-
tutional perspective, at least as signiﬁcant as the substantive results was the
general agreement on the process. Collaboration between the Commission,
the Council and the EP had resulted in an ad hoc working format that could
be replicated in the SRM negotiations.18 Meanwhile, the EP had managed
to be placed on an equal level with the Council. In the ensuing trilogue, the
EP lived up to its promise of being constructive, focussing on the accountabil-
ity and transparency of the new structures.
The step (Single rulebook and ESM involvement)
The varying flexibility of the steps, sequences and deadlines that had been
crucial for procuring the SSM was also used in the second phase. What had
long been treated as a single market issue, namely common rules for financial
services, now became part of the debate about the banking union and there-
fore subject to the same deadline. This mattered less for the CRD4 and CRR
trilogues, which were close to being agreed.19 It did matter, however, for
the BRRD and DGS. Grouping these legislative proposals under ‘the single
rulebook’ was not just about framing. The dossiers were politically linked by
the argument that a banking union could not function without a single set
of rules.
A central element of the BRRD was the bail-in of share- and bondholders.
The bail-in principle would become a game changer. This was because it
managed to combine the protection of depositors (as foreseen in the DGS)
with the orderly resolution of banks, while shifting the burden from taxpayers
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to the banks’ creditors and bondholders. It thus offered comfort to those who
had initially perceived a banking union, and a common resolution mechanism
in particular, as an indirect system of transfers (from Northern European sover-
eigns to Southern European banks). Some member states (Germany, Finland
and the Netherlands) were anything but enthusiastic about involving the ESM
in the banking union. However, for other member states (Portugal, Ireland and
Spain), access to ESM support was crucial. From an institutional perspective,
the second stage was therefore about ensuring progress on two formally
unrelated but politically linked tracks: the Eurogroup negotiations on direct
recapitalization and the Ecofin negotiations on the BRRD and DGS.
The role of the ESM in the banking union had already been briefly dis-
cussed in the first phase. Even before this debate had started, it was clear
that direct recapitalization would not come in time to be available for
Spain. Already in July 2012, the country had settled for ‘indirect recapitaliza-
tion’ of the banking sector via the sovereign.20 ESM involvement also featured
in the debate about ‘legacy assets’. The three finance ministers of Germany,
Finland and the Netherlands had voiced their concerns in this regard
through a joint statement:
The ESM can take direct responsibility for problems that occur under the new
supervision, but legacy assets should be the responsibility of national
authorities.21
This particular issue was addressed in the SSM general approach, as agreed in
December 2012, where the ECB was invited to perform balance sheet assess-
ments (consisting of asset quality reviews and stress tests) of the banks. While
the ECB framed it as ‘a clean sheets moment’, hesitant member states could
refer to this as an ‘entry test’.22 Actually excluding a bank from participating
in the SSM would be difﬁcult, because initially the plan was for all European
banks to fall under ECB supervision.
While this dealt with problems of the past, it did not solve the matter of
future ESM involvement. The ESM-related elements of the banking union
were dealt with by the Taskforce on Coordinated Action (TFCA), which
reported to the Euro Working Group (EWG) and the Eurogroup. This was an
informal, intergovernmental venue, in which the Commission and ECB were
present only as observers.23 It was thus up to the Eurogroup president to
maintain the momentum. Initially, this proved to be very difficult. Once the
immediate crisis matters had been addressed, the overall rationale of the
debate changed. The focus shifted from recapitalization to resolution and
from bail-out to bail-in.24 ESM involvement would only come at the very
end of a well-defined and uniform process for dealing with troubled banks.
The core features of this process were fleshed out in the BRRD.
With this, we move from the first to the second track. After years of prep-
arations, the Commission’s proposal on the BRRD had been presented in June
1244 B. NIELSEN AND S. SMEETS
2012. It covered a broad range of preparatory and preventive measures, cov-
ering early intervention as well as actual resolution. In terms of process man-
agement, these negotiations were mostly legislative business as usual. Most
relevant for our analysis are the substantive choices that were made. When
drafting the mammoth proposal, the Commission clearly made use of
varying levels of specificity. What would turn out to be one of the key issue
for debate, the 8% bail-in, was not even specified in the proposal.25 It came
out of a compromise in Ecofin. Some member states would have preferred
a lower number, but at the same time they were forced to admit that it
was very difficult to calculate the exact percentage that would be needed
for future resolutions. The high percentage constituted a compromise for
allowing some flexibility and possible exemptions from bail-in. With regard
to this flexibility, the negotiating parties again decided not to try to flesh
out all possible scenarios, but rather agree on the principle.
A matter that was discussed in great detail was the exact order in which
shareholders and creditors would be called upon to bear losses to finance a
restoration or resolution. The reason for this high level of specificity was the
banking crisis in Cyprus in March 2013. As part of the initial deal for Cyprus,
depositors with deposits below 100,000 euro would have been forced to
take losses via a special tax being levied on all deposits. New Eurogroup pre-
sident Dijsselbloem hinted that this might be the new line to follow in all
future banking crises. This conflicted with what was being negotiated under
the BRRD and DGS. In an affair that became known as ‘Template-gate’,
media sources marked this as ‘a watershed in how the EU deals with failing
banks’.26
The initial deal for Cyprus was quickly revised, and it did not come to affect
the BRRD negotiations directly. However, it did help those who argued for
bringing the implementation date forward (from 2018 to 2016). More signifi-
cantly, the Cyprus crisis helped the Eurogroup president in selling the banking
union to the more hesitant member states, not least his own:
Before Cyprus, progress was slow specifically on issues such as the public back-
stop, which countries like Germany considered to be a transfer. After Cyprus, the
debate was about what can we do privately and what do we still need to do pub-
licly. Now, there was something in it also for Germany, Finland and the
Netherlands.27
Securing the BRRD agreement in the Council (June 2013) was still no walk in
the park. The Ecoﬁn meeting of 21 June 2013 needed to be ‘extended’ to 26
June, rather than ‘reconvened’, in order to avoid crossing any deadlines. There
were long and difﬁcult negotiations about the funding, the ﬂexibility and the
starting date. In the end the Council agreed on a bail-in with mandatory
exceptions, ﬂexible exceptions and prohibitive rules for the intervention of
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the resolution ﬁnancing arrangement that each Member State would be
required to set up to manage a bank resolution.
The Cyprus crisis also created some new momentum on the ESM track. The
TFCA, EWG and Eurogroup managed to arrive at a provisional agreement on
the main features of the operational framework for direct recapitalization.
Given the link to the BRRD, it was proposed that the operational framework
be finalized as soon as the BRRD and DGS proposals had been finalized
with the European Parliament.28 Meanwhile, the possibilities for accessing
ESM funds also featured in the debate about backstops. While the ECB was
preparing for the comprehensive assessments of the banks that would
come under its supervision, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland continued
to insist that member states must provide national solutions to problems
which had occurred while banks were under national supervision. This is
reflected in the June 2013 European Council Conclusions:
In this context [the comprehensive assessment], Member States taking part in
the SSM will make all appropriate arrangements, including the establishment
of national backstops, ahead of the completion of this exercise.29
The appropriate ‘pecking order’ (ﬁrst private sources, then national and euro
area/EU instruments) would eventually be laid down in the November 2013
Ecoﬁn conclusions.30 Moving the goal posts characterized the debate about
ESM involvement. It would take until June 2014 for the Eurogroup to reach
a political understanding on direct recapitalization.31 It was still presented
as ‘another important pillar of the banking union’.32 But the member states
had set prohibitive criteria, making it unlikely that the instrument would
ever be used.33
The Lithuanian presidency was subsequently able to finish the trilogues on
the BRRD and DGS in time (December 2013), even though it had little to offer
to the EP on its main concern, which was the establishment of EU-level
funding.34 Opinions differ on how well the BRRD succeeded in harmonizing
recovery and resolution schemes. Critics argue that the directive, like the
CRD4 and CRR, is full of national exemptions and that some countries took
a long time to implement it. Nevertheless, institutional collaboration had
played a crucial role in anchoring the bail-in principle on a national level, as
well as in the mind-sets of those who would soon be dealing with it on a Euro-
pean level.
The hop (the SRM, SRF and backstop)
As the debate on the SRM was about to begin, a number of institutions
stepped back. First, there was less involvement from the European Council
level. At the European Council level, substantive comments were replaced
by procedural statements, the most important of which was the invitation
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to the Commission to present the SRM.35 European Council President Van
Rompuy made it perfectly clear that he had no intention of involving the
Heads of State and Government in the debate (Ludlow [2013a, 2013b]).
Even more than had been the case with the SSM, it was up to the legislators
to find the agreement. Second, there was less intensive cooperation between
the ECB and the Commission on the SRM proposal.36 In contrast to the SSM,
the ECB would be just another party providing its opinion on the Commis-
sion’s proposal and participating in the meetings.
These meetings got off to a flying start, working from the same ad hoc
working party format and consisting to a large extent of the same people.
The Lithuanian presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat, chaired
about a dozen meetings. An early obstacle in the negotiations was to find
agreement on how to calculate the bank contributions to the SRF. This was
a tricky issue since the contribution of an individual bank could change
according to whether its contribution was calculated on a national or Euro
Area-wide basis. The Commission therefore proposed to deal with the ques-
tion by delegated act, hoping that it would not become an issue during the
negotiation.37 Member states can, and some in fact did, object to the sugges-
tion to put this matter under delegated act, but it soon became clear that it
would be impossible to settle before the December deadline. Thus the Com-
mission approach was no longer challenged.
Another issue that would prove impossible to settle before Christmas was
the common backstop, an issue that fell well outside the legislative scope. The
Eurogroup came up with another creative solution, which is reflected in a
statement that became part of the Ecofin conclusions on 18/19 December
2013:
During the initial build-up phase of the fund, bridge financing will be available
from national sources, backed by bank levies, or from the European Stability
Mechanism, in accordance with existing procedures… During this transitional
phase, a common backstop will be developed, which would become fully oper-
ational at the latest after 10 years.38
Deadlock on a backstop was avoided by agreeing that this was an issue that
really only needed to be dealt with once the SRF was fully operational
(expected in 2024). This immediately created the new problem of what
would happen if a bank failed in the intervening period. But the chairs of
the EWG and Eurogroup presumed that agreeing on temporary bridge ﬁnan-
cing would be easier than on a permanent backstop. The former might then
be used as a template for the latter. Nevertheless, the negotiations on both
would be postponed until after the agreement on the constitutive elements
of the banking union.39
By moving the goal posts (on the backstop and bank contributions) and
opting for a low level of specificity (on the bridge financing), the institutions
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were able to keep the process going. However, the main obstacle still loomed:
German opposition to the use of Article 114 of the Treaty of the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) as a legal basis for establishing the SRM. The article
is about approximation provisions to improve the functioning of the internal
market. There were doubts as to whether it provided a sufficient basis for
creating a new body (the SRB) and for providing the funding (through the
SRF). In the beginning of December, little progress had been made on this
matter.
At this key moment, joint stewardship failed, as institutional strategies were
out of sync, at least at the political level. The Commission, on the one hand,
was not willing to seriously consider an alternative legal base. Instead of pre-
paring for eventualities, they maintained that Article 114 was the only option.
The Commission appeared to be mimicking its approach on the SSM, with
Commissioner Barnier trusting that he would again be able to procure conces-
sions from the German finance minister Schäuble. The Lithuanian presidency,
on the other hand, had the feeling that Germany would not budge on this
issue. Moreover, they were aware of their own limitations. Being effective as
a chair depends on more than being transparent, well-organized and able
to meet deadlines:
One needs to be strong enough to say ‘no’ to the big guys. To be able to do this,
one needs sufficient backing from the political level. Lower-level process man-
agement can be undone if ministers are overwhelmed by the likes of Sapin or
Schäuble.40
The latter invited the Lithuanian presidency, the Commission and some key
delegations to private meetings in Berlin. The idea of splitting off the
process of the SRF from the SRM was discussed here. The former would be
negotiated through an intergovernmental agreement (IGA). The Commission
and EP objected heavily to this ‘re-intergovernmentalization’ of the decision-
making process. The EP stated that it would continue to treat the SRM and SRF
as a package. Meanwhile, the outgoing Lithuanian presidency proceeded with
laying out the groundwork for the IGA. At the regular Ecoﬁn meeting on 10
December there was broad support for splitting off the SRF from the main
Regulation. This resulted in a hectic redrafting of the relevant text in the
period between the two Councils. Going into the extraordinary Ecoﬁn of 18
December 2013, the Chair and the Secretariat knew that they had the basis
for a deal.
In hammering out the details, the Council would again make use of varying
levels of specificity. The key open issue was the governance of the single res-
olution board (SRB). But participants were well aware that this would be one of
the main issues for debate in the SRM trilogue. Any Council agreement would
therefore not be definitive, as EP representatives were already criticizing the
complex solution reflected in the general approach.41 To make the mutual
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fund easier to swallow, the Netherlands had suggested creating national com-
partments. The mutualization of these compartments over time could then be
decided as part of the IGA. The Council Secretariat would specify the modal-
ities of the intergovernmental conference.
Yet another type of institutional collaboration proved necessary to secure
the final deal. The IGC had to be set up in less than two days.42 The incoming
Greek presidency had not planned to present a chair. Given the link with the
negotiations in the Eurogroup on the backstop/bridge financing, the Sec-
retariat suggested that the meetings be chaired by the chair of the EWG,
Thomas Wieser. To pre-empt tough trilogues, they also suggested including
the EP, formally only as observers, but with the right to actively participate
in the discussions. This constituted a modest step towards a Convention-
like format, but it worked remarkably well: the EP representatives participated
constructively and the member states proved themselves remarkably open to
dealing with the thorny issues, in spite of their presence.
Sequencing was again key to success. The EP wanted to be able to take the
results of the IGA into account when dealing with the SRM. The terms of refer-
ence, as agreed by the ECOFIN Council, stated that the results of the confer-
ence would be presented at the beginning of March 2014. Work therefore
needed to be swift. The IGC managed to reach a provisional agreement on
the (mutualization of the) national compartments before the deciding trilogue
with the EP on 18/19 March 2014. The Eurogroup president then took it upon
himself to close the deal. Dijsselbloem effectively merged the intergovern-
mental and Community processes, and personally worked on hammering
out a deal on the decision-making structures within the SRB in an all-night tri-
logue meeting between the Council, Commission and Parliament. The
member states agreed to introduce a greater degree of mutualization and
to shorten the mutualization period in the IGA by two years. The EP was
forced to acknowledge the legal limitations stemming from the fact that
the SRB was an agency, while the final resolution decision needed to be
taken by an institution.43 The compromise was an intricate power-sharing
arrangement between the Council and the Commission.
Conclusion
This article analysed the role of the EU institutions in setting up the banking
union and the opportunities for providing leadership during that process. We
sought to determine how, rather than how much, the institutions mattered.
After reading the analysis, some might wonder to what extent this process
was ever really institution-led. We have argued that this represents a new
type of institutional leadership, tailored to the constraining environment in
which the negotiations took place. In the analysis, we fleshed out the
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characteristics of this collaborative leadership on four levels. We now discuss
some of its limitations.
As our analysis of the initial phase has shown, the mandate to launch a
banking union was effectively created by the agents themselves, in particular
the ECB and Commission. The trade-off is that these agents needed to keep
their principals committed. The European Council’s endorsement in particular
was crucial:
Our job was to keep the leaders committed to the project; so with each summit
we made sure that there were conclusions about the banking union in which we
noted the progress made and set new deadlines. These deadlines were certainty
not always respected. But they helped to keep the pressure on the ministers.44
Participants characterize the establishment of the banking union as ‘a mara-
thon dressed up as a sprint’.45 In reality it looked more like a relay race. For
a period of almost two years, representatives felt as if they were working in
a pressure cooker, and no one, neither from a member state nor from an insti-
tution, would dare to be the one to wreck the process.
The second trade-off concerns the limited ability of individual agents to
steer, let alone control, developments. The banking union represents an
acknowledgement of new realities in EU decision making. This was not leader-
ship through intergovernmental coordination, fitting with the conjectures of
new intergovernmentalism. The substantive role of the European Council and
its president was limited. Its high-level guidance did not lead to detailed
instructions. This was also not leadership through supranational entrepre-
neurship. The entrepreneurial role of the Commission and ECB on the SSM
could not be replicated on the SRM. Commissioner Barnier was dominant at
specific stages of the legislative processes, but he did not guide the overall
project. The Commission needed to channel ideas through the European
Council, where the Commission was represented by its President. Both Euro-
pean Council President Van Rompuy and Commission President Barroso in
turn needed to rely on Draghi’s plenary interventions to keep the Heads com-
mitted. Meanwhile, the EWG and Eurogroup were crucial for procuring the
necessary (albeit it so far limited) ESM involvement. The intergovernmental
and supranational agents did not compete with, but rather needed, one
another to make their interventions work, not just once but continuously
throughout the process.
The third trade-off is related to the first. It is relatively easy to organize
open-ended discussions, but it is more difficult to maintain their pace. In
establishing the banking union, external events like crises or elections
ensured a continued sense of urgency. What can happen when the pressure
is taken off became apparent with the relaunch of the banking union project,
as part of the June 2015 Five Presidents report. While the agents were still
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eager to continue with the work, the principals did not seem to share their
sense of urgency anymore.
The fourth trade-off stems from the ability ‘to pick and choose’which issues
to deal with in detail. The obvious downside to postponing the more difficult
points is that becomes less likely that they will eventually be dealt with. In a
traditional IGC, deals on difficult issues, in this case a public backstop or a
common resolution fund, would typically be reached through issue-linkages
or as part of package deals (Beach [2005]). There were attempts to create
such linkages in the banking union, for instance between the SSM and
direct recapitalization (Glöckler et al. [2016]). But the two issues could be
decoupled just as easily, and on the former a faster and more far-reaching
deal was reached. In the banking union process, there are continuing
doubts as to whether the ‘high-hanging fruit’ (the common DGS or EDIS in
particular) will eventually be picked. Some feel that the current arrangements
fall short in breaking the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns - which
was the motivation for launching the project in the first place (Schäfer [2016]).
As stated above, the conditions for acquiring access to direct recapitalization
are highly stringent, the SRF will be tiny in its first few years and the agree-
ment on bridge financing essentially comes down to member states guaran-
teeing to back up their own national compartments.
These limitations should be kept in mind when attempting to draw lessons
from the case of the banking union: First, the process was exceptional in many
ways, and there is no guarantee that the mechanism of collaborative leader-
ship would operate in the same way under ‘normal’ circumstances or under
pressure of a different kind.46 Second, there was nothing inevitable about
the banking union. Notwithstanding functional imperatives, overlapping
interests and a crisis atmosphere, it was a long way to travel from an initially
auxiliary supervisory mechanism to a single resolution fund. Nor did the insti-
tutions succeed in making it inevitable. What they did was to make a banking
union feasible. Even near the end of 2013, there were doubts that the finish
line would be reached; but at least the institutions had ensured that a way
to get there had been clearly marked out.
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